Introduction
The importance of multinational firms (MNFs) which own and control assets in different countries has grown rapidly over the last decade [e.g. Casson (1987) ; Shapiro (1989) ]. MNFs have increased continuously their share of international trade and investments [see Lipsey (1989) ]. About one third of the world's trade consists of trade between subsidiaries and branches within MNFs [UNCTC (1988) ].
Foreign direct investments, international production and sales reflect a world in which technology and capital have become increasingly mobile. Due to the continuous changes in comparative advantages among national economies, advances in international communication, transportation and government policies, more and more firms now distribute their production plants and market service systems around the globe.
On the other hand in recent years we witness some greater fluctuations in the exchange rates of the major currencies. For international firms the need to manage foreign currency risks has increased substantially during the last decade [see Krugman (1989) ]. Consequently in the developed countries a variety of hedging techniques are being offered by financial markets. However this is not true in many less developed countries where currency future markets, currency options or equivalent arrangements are either limited or nonexistent.
Recently there have been many contributions to the theory of exporting firms under stochastic currencies where the effects and the role of futures mar kets have been analyzed [Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha (1985) , Stein (1986) , Eldor and Zilcha (1987) ]. One important result of these studies is that in the presence of futures markets the exporting firm will choose its Output as if it were in a position of certainty. This property is known als the 'Separation property' and was first shown by Danthine (1978) for competitive firms un der price uncertainty. In this paper we analyze the implications of currency 1 futures markets in the context of a two-country firm which is selling as well as producing at home and abroad. 1 Our objective is to investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty and the role of futures markets upon the international production, sales and direct Investment of a risk-averse monopolistic MNF. In our model the foreign direct investments affect the demand side abroad rather than the technology in the foreign country.
Suppose that a horizontally integrated, price discriminating MNF produ ces and sells the same differentiated commodity in two countries. We allow the production technology used in each country to differ. Our model includes the case where the MNF has a firm-specific advantage that enables it to operate at home and in the foreign country as a monopolist [see Helpman and Krugman (1985) , Horstmann and Markusen (1989) ]. Each country's currency is freely exchanged via some random exchange rate. Purchasing power parity does not hold. The firm chooses production and sales in both countries to maximize expected profits denominated in the home currency [see CalderonRossell (1985) ]. In our model it is assumed that production levels, allocation of sales and direct investments, must be determined before the exchange rate is known.
In section 2 the model is described. In section 3 we study the effects of uncertainty in the exchange rate. We show that the stochastic exchange rate implies higher production in the foreign country and lower sales abroad. In section 4 we analyze the impact of currency futures markets. A Separation result [see Danthine (1978) ] is obtained for this two-country firm, i.e., when a currency futures market is available production and the allocation of sales are independent of the distribution of the random exchange rate and of the firm's attitude towards risk. In section 5 we study the effect of currency futures on this firm's foreign direct investment. In section 6 we derive the effect of increases in the firm's risk aversion in the absence of futures markets.
1 This aspect was also developed in a different framework by I tagaki (1981). The MNF sells its product in the domestic market and in the foreign market, where in both segmented markets it has a monopoly power. We denote the total revenue functions by R(y) in the home market and by R*(y*) in the foreign market. We assume that both R{y) and R*(y*) are concave functions.
The MNF chooses the levels of production, sales and trade between the two markets before the exchange rate is known. To simplify our analysis we assume that the cost of transportation in intra-firm trade, i.e., trade between the parent and foreign subsidiary of the MNF, is negligible. We also assume that the MNF is risk-averse. The only source of uncertainty in our economy is the exchange rate e, which has a known distribution function.
Thus the multinational firm is assumed to maximize the managers' expected utility of profits denominated in the home currency subject to technological and markets constraints. Given the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility {/(•), where U' > 0, U" < 0, the firm chooses its product levels (x, x*) and sales (y,y*) in both countries. So the decision problem can be written as (under the market constraint x + x* = y + y*):
We shall not consider here the extreme case where it is optimal to produce in one country only, i.e., x = 0 or x* = 0. 3 Since the cost functions are convex and the total revenue functions are concave, II is concave in x, x* and y. Thus, necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum in problem (1), assuming that x, x* and y are positive at the optimum are
The expectation is with respect to the given distribution function of e. In the following sections we shall use these first order conditions in order to explore the effects of uncertainty in the exchange rate on the MNF's global decisions, intra-firm trade transactions and futures contracting.
The Effect of Uncertainty
Uncertainty in the exchange rate has real effects on production, sales and intra-firm trade structure. In our study we suppose that the net foreign revenue is not negative R*(y*) -C *(x*) > 0. This is a crucial assumption and implies that the MNF is making a non negative profit abroad. 4 To explore the impact of uncertainty let us use (3)-(5). Since EeU'(tl) > 0 we obtain from (5) that,
Also, from (3) and (4) we obtain that
Using (4) and (5) we derive also,
Since II increases as e attains higher realizations (note that at the Optimum R*{y*) ~C*(x*) > 0) and since U' is a decreasing function, by our assumption that U" < 0, we have Cov(e,U'(Tl)) < 0. Thus (8) yields (with Ee = e),
Denote by x* and xc the optimal output when e is the exchange rate, i.e., the certainty-equivalent case. Then from the optimality conditions for the certainty case, we obtain
Now we can state the following relations regarding the optimal levels of pro duction used under uncertainty and under its certainty equivalent.
Lemma: x* > x* and x < xc .
Proof: Assume that x > xc, then by assumptions about the cost functions C'(x) > C'(xc). This implies, using (7), that R'(y) > R'(yc), i.e., y < yc.
Since R'{yc) -e i?*'(y*) and from (3) we derive also,
We obtain that R*'(y*) > R*'{y*) hence y* < y*. This implies that y + y* < yc + y*, i.e., total sales in the certainty equivalent case is higher. However, since by our assumption x > xc and x-f x* = y+y*, we must have x* < x*. But from (6), (9) and (10) The proof is a direct result of the Lemma and (6) and (7).
It has been shown in Theorem 1 that the MNF repatriates profits under exchange rate risk by repatriating the physical Output, thus reducing its netexposure to this risk. Or, in other words, the MNF internalizes the missing hedging markets by increasing foreign production and lowering foreign sales thus increasing costs and decreasing revenues denominated in foreign cur rency. This is a further example where MNFs can internalize some market imperfections [see Helpman and Krugman (1985) ]. In our model the internalization of the MNF encourages foreign production and intra-firm trade when there are no external financial markets for hedging transactions.
Futures Markets
Consider now the behavior of the MNF in the presence of foreign currency futures markets. 5 In this case when the firm makes its decision about the production levels and allocation of the sales in the two markets, it chooses its optimal contract for currency sale in the futures market. Suppose the forward exchange rate e/ is given, then z is the amount of its futures currency 5 There is no basis risk, which implies that there is no distinction between futures and forward markets. The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optiraum are, basically, conditi
ons (3), (4) and (5) for this case and an additional obtained by differentiating w.r.t. z, i.e.,
E{ef -e)U'(tl) = 0.
From (3) and (13) we obtain
Like in the classical case of a price-discriminating firm, the MNF allocates its Output in a way that equates marginal revenues in both markets taking the futures rate as the exchange rate. Condition (14) implies that the MNF is hedging perfectly against the foreign marginal revenue risk. This hedging behavior is valid even when the MNF finds it not optimal to hedge against the total net revenue risk.
From (4), (5) and (14) we also derive that,
Thus the optimization in the presence of currency futures markets results in equating the marginal cost in both countries, where e/ is the contemplated exchange rate. Now we prove a Separation theorem for this model. Thus, Theorem 2 shows that when a futures market is available the MNF behaves just as in the füll certainty case where e/ plays the role of the "certain" exchange rate: The allocation of production and the intra-firm trade to allocate sales are determined by the usual rules, equating marginal revenues and marginal costs. 6
Theorem 2. (Separation
The Separation theorem was first proved by Danthine (1978) for a competitive firm [see also Kawai and Zilcha (1986) ]. Its extension to our model demonstrates that the MNF's decisions are independent of the utility func tion or the probability distribution of the exchange rate changes. This means that two MNFs with identical revenue functions and technologies but with different attitudes towards risk and different probability beliefs will choose the same levels of Outputs and sales.
However, the hedging behavior of the MNF will depend on the attitude towards risk and the distribution of e. If the risk premium is positive, i.e.,
&j < e, then the futures sale of currency is less than the net foreign reve nue. With unbiasedness, i.e., ej = e, the firm hedges such that its profits are totally independent of the realization of the exchange rate. If the risk premium is negative (i.e., e/ > e) the MNF sells forward more than its net revenues abroad, i.e., it speculates. This is summarized in (where z is the optimal futures sales of currency) 
Corollary. Unbiasedness case:

Proof: Let us rewrite ft as follows f[ = R(y) -C (x) + ze/ + e[R*(y*) -C*{x*) -z \. Using (13), we obtain that {ef -e)EU'(tl) = Cov(e, U'(fl)).
If the LHS of (16) is zero, hence the covariance of e with the strictly decreasing function of ft, {/'(It), is zero then II must be independent of e, i.e., (16) This includes the case where the addition to total revenue function is an increasing function of S* (i.e., independent of the level of sales). Now let us rewrite the firm's optimization problem with foreign investment, assuming that futures currency markets exist.
Z = R*(y*) -C *(x*). Similarly if the LHS of
max{XiX.tyis*,z)EU( fi) s.t. (17) n = R(y) + eR*(x + x* -y; S*) -C(x) -eC*(x*) -eS* + z(ef -e).
The first order conditions are (3)- (5), (13) and
where Sf and t/y d enote the optimum foreign investment and foreign sales in the presence of futures markets. Since EeU'(fl) > 0, we obtain from (18),
Now let us prove that introducing currency futures market results in higher foreign direct investment if the risk premium is not too high. Denote by S* the optimal foreign investments, under exchange rate uncertainty, without currency futures market.
Theorem 3. The introduction of a currency futures market which is unbiased results in a higher foreign investment of the multinational firm, i.e., Sf > S*.
Proof: Let us note first that the optimal foreign sales and foreign invest ment change in the same direction, as we vary e or the variance of e. This follows directly from (19) which holds always, since dR*Stt/dy* > 0 and R*s*s' < 0-Consider the case where the futures market is unbiased. As we have shown earlier in the presence of futures markets sales y* (and other decision variables) are independent of the distribution of e. Hence if e/ = c then y*j = y*, where y* and S* are the certainty equivalent foreign sales and foreign investment. By Theorem 1, y* > y* therefore we obtain from
which implies that Sj > S*. Thus whenever ey = e we obtain that SJ > S*.
Due to the continuity of all the functions this inequality holds for e/ > e -0, for some positive 6 which depends on the various parameters of the model.
Let us consider now the effects of changes in the futures exchange rate ey on the foreign direct investment Sf. Such variations may result from changes in the expected value of e, i.e., e or perhaps as a consequence of changes in the variance of e, which will be reflected in the futures price.
Theorem 4• In the presence of currency futures market, an increase in the
futures price ey will result in higher foreign investment Sj and higher sales abroad yf.
Proof: The proof is based on (14), (15) and (19) which hold in the presence of a futures market. Assume that the contrary to our claim holds, i.e., Sy declines as a result of higher ey. This implies by (19) that j/y d eclines as well when ey increases since
Thus, using the strict concavity of R*(y*,S*) in S*,
Therefore, by our assumption about yj, efR*'(yJ) increases as ey increases hence, by (14), the domestic sales y decreases and thus y + y} decreases. Now let us apply (6) and (7). The decline of t/y and y will cause x* and x to increase (since the marginal cost functions are increasing). Thus I + I* increase. But x + x* = y + yj, which is a contradiction. Therefore we conclude that dy*f/def > 0. By (21), this implies that dSj/dej > 0 which proves the theorem.
As in Theorem 4 we see that if the currency futures price is positively correlated to e then an increase in e results in higher foreign investment Sj. Proof: Let us use (7) to define the function: x = a(y) . Since R'(y) is decreasing and C'(x) increasing, it is easy to verify that at < 0. Now when we consider the optimization problem (1) we can maximize the expected utility of profits with respect to (x*,y) replacing x by a(y). In this case equation
Let one MNF, which is either risk averse or risk neutral, have a utility function U while the other's utility is V(II) = /[{/(II)], with / satisfying f > 0, f" < 0; i.e., V is a concave transformation of U. The optimality conditions for the firm V (denoted by (")) are:
Now we shall use the fact that f and U' are decreasing while II is an incre asing function of e, hence
Thus by (23) we derive that
Now consider maximization of EV(II) with respect to y and x*. Since the maximand is a concave function of (y, x") then comparing the optimal levels of V (determined by (23) and (24)) with the optimal levels of (y, x") when we maximize EU (II), we come to the following conclusion: Comparing (25) and (5) with (22) and (5), we find that y > y and x* > x* .
Using (6) and (7) we derive from (26) that x > x and y* < y*, which completes the proof.
Concluding Remarks
Futures markets are frequently used by international commercial firms to insure against price and exchange rate risks. This paper has provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of futures markets in foreign exchange 13 on the allocation of production and sales of a two-country monopolistic firm.
The cost functions, and hence technology of production, in the two countries may differ.
Our model assumes that the decisions of the firm regarding production and allocation of sales between the two markets are made before the realization of the random exchange rate. Such an approach has been taken in a model of an exporting firm by Katz, Paroush and Kahana (1982) . A different approach can be found in the literature where all production decisions are prior to the realization of the exchange rate but decisions about sales in the two markets are made after the exchange rate is observed [Eldor and Zilcha (1987) ].
Note that there is some "symmetry" between the home and the foreign countries in the profit function (2). Thus our assumption that the MNF maximizes expected profits denominated in the home currency may be replaced by an assumption that IT is denominated in the foreign currency, without having much impact on the results. In some cases we should reverse the inequalities (e.g., in Theorem 1 and Theorem 5). However, the analysis can be conducted similarly.
The paper has extended to multinational firms the results in the litera ture demonstrating the importance of establishing currency futures markets for exporting firms which do not produce in both countries. Particulary the extension of the well-known 'Separation property' to the case of a multina tional firm with some monopolistic power is very interesting.
